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MOTHERS IN CRISIS:  
REDEFINING AND EXPANDING THE DISASTER LAW 
FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS PREGNANT WOMEN’S 






The management of maternal health care under current United States disaster 
law remains inadequate in its ability to properly, effectively, and quickly address 
the needs of pregnant women. Current federal, state, and local emergency plans 
are not required to conform to a particular standard in their care of pregnant 
women and most fail to even mention the needs of pregnant women in a 
meaningful or practical manner. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina shed light on the 
particular vulnerability of pregnant women in the midst of a disaster. It ignited 
administrative and legislative reform due to the shortcomings of federal and 
state governments in their management of victims’ health care. As evidenced by 
the recent Flint Water Crisis, however, systemic failures in government plans 
and policies continue to prevent pregnant women from accessing satisfactory 
and speedy health care in the face of an emergency. 
 
To tackle the current shortcomings of disaster law in addressing the needs of 
pregnant women, this Comment proposes a two-pronged approach. The first 
prong requires working within the current legal framework to recognize that 
maternal health is a health care as well as a public health matter. Encouraging 
the use of emergency declarations under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 
in addition to declarations under the Stafford Act, will allow for quicker federal 
government involvement and access to additional sources of funding. This is 
particularly significant for pregnant women who require immediate care and 
assistance. The second prong requires expanding the current disaster law 
framework through the introduction of new legislation. By using the Flint Water 
Crisis to shed light on the shortcomings of the legal and regulatory framework 
to address pregnant women’s health care needs, Flint can serve as an impetus 
for legislative reform as Hurricane Katrina once did. 
 
The first part of this Comment describes the impact of inadequate disaster 
planning and management, under the current legal framework, on the health care 
needs of pregnant women in two tragedies: Hurricane Katrina and the Flint Water 
Crisis. In times of disasters, pregnant women face an increase in pregnancy-
related health complications that require states to be prepared to deal with their 
particularized health care needs. Although Flint occurred almost a decade later 
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than Hurricane Katrina, the legislative and policy reforms set forth after Katrina 
were not sufficient to lead to proper planning and care of the women in Flint. 
 
The second part of this Comment argues that one of the potential solutions to 
addressing the maternal health care inadequacies is that they should not be 
viewed solely as a health care matter but as a public health priority as well. The 
“health care classification” focuses on individualized delivery of medical care 
while the public health system works to address health issues in populations 
rather than in individuals. This Comment seeks to broaden the scope of the 
disaster law framework to address maternal health issues by extending it into 
the public health field. Utilization of the Stafford Act’s health care classification 
in conjunction with the PHSA’s “public health classification” can be used to fill 
in the gaps left by current United States’ disaster plans to address the needs of 
vulnerable communities like pregnant women. 
 
Lastly, this Comment proposes reform to the emergency and disaster law 
framework that would result in the formation of a federal standard regarding 
preparation and response protocols to addressing maternal health concerns. The 
third part of this Comment describes the legislative and administrative changes to 
disaster law and health policy in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and argues 
that the recent Flint Water Crisis should serve as a similar impetus for legislative 
and policy change to the management of maternal health issues in times of disaster. 
The lack of emergency preparation and response to quickly and effectively protect 
pregnant women and infants from lead contamination in their main water source 
highlights systemic failures in the United States disaster law framework. While 
recommendations have been made from federal agencies and NGOs, no legally 
binding standard has been established that would require states to model their 
emergency plans on a minimum standard of care. This standard should treat 
maternal health as an individualized health care issue as well as a public health 
matter. Prioritizing the care of pregnant women and mothers is a human issue that 




The occurrence of natural and man-made emergencies and disasters1 
undoubtedly lead to turmoil. Incidents such as September 11th, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are etched into our memories 
																																								 																				
1 See NAN D. HUNTER, THE LAW OF EMERGENCIES: PUBLIC HEALTH AND DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT 194 (2009) (clarifying that the major difference between a disaster declaration and 
an emergency declaration is the amount of federal assistance made available to states; a disaster 
declaration results in the availability of many more forms of financial assistance). The terms 
“emergency” and “disaster” will both be used concurrently throughout this Comment. 
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because of the profound consequences they have on human life. Survivors are 
left to deal with physical and emotional harm, loss of community, finding 
temporary shelter and long-term housing, and an interruption in their financial 
and economic sources. As expected, hospitals, clinics, and other health care 
facilities become flooded with medical emergencies. The health care concerns 
arising out of the occurrence of disasters are particularly complex in their scope, 
the short-term and long-term effects they have on individuals and communities, 
and the legal obligations imparted on government and private actors to 
adequately prepare and respond to them within a federalized system. 
Disasters often lead to disruptions of access to health care due to the 
severity of their effect on a community. However, they do not affect all 
communities equally. While disasters do not discriminate in whom they affect, 
there is a discriminatory pattern in how they affect individuals and communities.2 
Poor and medically underserved communities often carry an inequitable amount 
of the burden resulting from disasters because of preexisting obstacles to 
obtaining accessible, reliable, and quality health care.3 The medical community 
has found that disasters may “catalyze new or exacerbate existent disparities in 
health and health care”4 within an affected population.  
One group that is specifically vulnerable5 to health care inadequacies in 
the face of emergencies and disasters are mothers and pregnant women. Pregnant 
women, newborns, and infants are disproportionally harmed by the 
occurrence of an emergency or disaster6 and most United States’ emergency 
plans do not incorporate the specialized needs of mothers and children. The 
lack of access to food, clean water, health care, and medication can severely 
increase pregnancy-related morbidities.7 Pregnant women suffer from a 
																																								 																				
2 See Jennifer R. Davis et al., The Impact of Disasters on Populations with Health and Health 
Care Disparities, 4 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 30 (2010) (arguing that 
health care disparities post-disasters must be contextualized by pre-existing factors such as 
race, income, and sex). 
3 Id. at 30. 
4 Id. 
5 See Jane M. Henrici, et al., Women, Disasters, and Hurricane Katrina, http://www.iwpr.org 
/initiatives/katrina-the-gulf-coast#sthash.ts1vu89J.dpuf (last visited May 4, 2016) (stating that 
women, and particularly pregnant women, often suffer disproportionately in comparison to most 
men when disaster strikes due to multiple factors; these factors include limited access to resources, 
a higher likelihood of poverty in women than in men, and women “share a greater responsibility 
for child care than men and more often than men have the home as their workplace, with 
residences often of less stable construction than commercial or public buildings”). 
6 Id. 
7 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDER-
SERVED WOMEN, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 457, PREPARING FOR DISASTERS: PERSPECTIVES ON 
WOMEN 1 (2010), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-
Care-for-Underserved-Women/co457.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20160518T1922303176. 
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disruption of prenatal care, an increase in the incidence of preterm delivery, 
an increase in complications such as decreased birth weights and small head 
circumferences, and difficulties with establishing and maintaining lactation.8 
These health difficulties can have significant short-term and long-term effects 
on mothers, children, and families. 
 
II. THE IMPACT OF EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS ON  
MATERNAL HEALTH CARE 
 
A. Hurricane Katrina 
 
i. Hurricane Katrina and Maternal Health Care 
 
Of the many lessons learned, “Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the 
critical need for having plans in place for vulnerable populations that have 
medical and physical limitations.”9 In particular, Hurricane Katrina 
highlighted the extreme vulnerability of women, infants, and children during 
disasters.10 United States emergency and disaster preparedness plans “seldom 
included the needs of mothers and children during the acute or recovery 
phases of a disaster.”11 In evaluating the impact on mothers and children, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that the fourteen 
FEMA designated counties and parishes affected by Hurricane Katrina had 
“a significant increase in the number of women who received late or no 
prenatal care.”12 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women found significant 
increases in inadequate prenatal care in designated counties in Mississippi 
(exhibited an increase from 2.3% to 3.3%) and in Louisiana (exhibited an 
increase from 2.3% to 3.9% among Hispanic women).13 
																																								 																				
8 Id. 
9 Dan Sosin, Emergency Response 10 Years After Katrina, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION PUB. HEALTH MATTERS BLOG (Aug. 28, 2015), http://blogs. 
cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2015/08/emergency-response-10-years-after-katrina/ 
(underscoring one of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina when Dr. Sosin served as 
the U.S. Public Health Service’s liaison between public health and medical incident 
command staff at the state and Federal levels). 
10 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR 
UNDERSERVED WOMEN, supra note 7. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. (providing the statistics).  See also Brady E. Hamilton et al., The Effect of Hurricane 
Katrina: Births in the U.S. Gulf Coast Region, Before and After the Storm, U.S. CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REP., Aug. 28, 2009, at 7, 
126        Journal of Law & Public Affairs   [July 2016	
	
An increase in pregnancy-related health complications was also 
discovered in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Women who “experienced 
three or more severe traumatic situations during the hurricane, such as feeling 
as though one's life was in danger, walking through flood waters, or having a 
loved one die, were found to have a higher rate of low birth weight infants and 
an increase in preterm deliveries”14 Pregnant women with high hurricane 
exposure had a “more than three-fold increased risk of having low birth weight 
infants” and “more than two-fold increased risk of having preterm birth 
infants.”15 
Several impediments within the health care delivery system post-Katrina 
also contributed to further complications for pregnant women. Many critically 
ill newborn babies and pregnant women were evacuated to hospitals in 
neighboring states.16 “Some of the fragile newborns arrived without their 
mothers, and some women delivered on their way to the facility;”17 the 
occurrences of mother-child separations only caused further anxiety and distress 
in an already difficult situation. Those who arrived safely to a health care facility 
often arrived without records, medications, or prenatal vitamins.18 
The maternal health issues resulting from Hurricane Katrina affected 
women on an individual basis and simultaneously fall within the scope of a 
public health issue as well. Although health care access concerns – such as a 
pregnant women’s inability to reach a hospital safely or arriving to the hospital 
without medical records – are routinely individualized care problems, they are 
also part of a greater system failure that cultivates these shared, common 
difficulties affecting women as a whole population. The lack of hospital, 
federal, state, and local emergency plans to accommodate and adequately 
address the needs of pregnant women during Hurricane Katrina was eye 
opening. Many federal agencies and non-governmental organizations sough to 
address this shortcoming by providing information and guidance on how best 
to address maternal health care issues in preparation for and in the aftermath of 
disasters. 
																																								 																				
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_02.pdf (providing additional statistics 
and analysis). 
14 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR 
UNDERSERVED WOMEN, supra note 7, at 69-72.  See also Xu Xiong et al., Exposure to 
Hurricane Katrina, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Birth Outcomes, 336 AM. J. MED. 
SCI. 111 (2008) (analyzing the effects of such traumatic experiences). 
15 Xiong et al., supra note 14. 
16 Rama Lakshmi, Group Urges Disaster Planning for Pregnant Women, Babies, WASH. 
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ii. Federal Response to Maternal Health Issues in Hurricane Katrina 
 
The CDC’s Division of Reproductive Health took the lead on the federal 
response to the maternal health issues arising out of Hurricane Katrina. The  
Division of Reproductive Health focused its efforts on working with local, state, 
and federal partners to develop guides and informational toolkits for addressing 
the health needs of women for emergency and disaster preparedness and 
response.19 Specifically, the Reproductive Health Assessment After Disaster 
Toolkit was developed in order to assess the reproductive health needs of women 
affected by natural and man-made disasters.20 The Disaster Toolkit addressed 
issues such as infant care, health and risk behaviors, and safe motherhood; the 
data collected was used to promote evidence-based local programs and services 
for women and their families.21 The Division of Reproductive Health also 
published a guide on identifying “common post-disaster epidemiologic 
indicators” for pregnant women, post-partum women, and infants.22 Similar to 
the Disaster Toolkit, this guide was meant to build scientific knowledge through 
data collection for implementation into programs and services directly 
addressing the needs of this at-risk community. 
 
iii. NGO Response to Maternal Health Issues in Hurricane Katrina 
 
The White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood was one of the most 
vocal non-governmental organizations to shed light on the failure of U.S. 
emergency preparedness programs to address women’s health issues and 
particularly, the absence of policies regarding maternal health care. In response 
to the shortcomings exposed during Hurricane Katrina, members of the Alliance 
conducted an extensive review of state and federal emergency plans existing in 
2006 and found a severe lack of attention to the health care needs of women.23 
																																								 																				
19 See Emergency Preparedness and Response: Pregnant Women and Newborns, U.S. CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/emergency/ (last visited May 20, 2016) (detailing 
the CDC’s Division of Reproductive Health response). 
20 See Reproductive Health Assessment After Disasters: A Toolkit for U.S. Health 
Departments, UNC CTR. FOR PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS, https://nciph.sph.unc.edu/RH 
AD/ (last visited May 20, 2016) (providing an introduction and history of the kit). 
21 Id. 
22 See U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH INDICATORS FOR DISASTER-
AFFECTED PREGNANT WOMEN, POSTPARTUM WOMEN, AND INFANTS (2014), http://www.cdc. 
gov/reproductivehealth/Emergency/PDFs/PostDisasterIndicators_final_6162014.pdf. 
23 See NAT’L WORKING GRP. FOR WOMEN & INFANT NEEDS IN EMERGENCIES IN THE U.S., 
WOMEN AND INFANTS SERVICE PACKAGE (WISP) (2007), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/def 
ault/files/public/php/315/315_recommendations.pdf (finding that authorities do not pay enough 
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To more adequately address the health care needs of “pregnant women, new 
mothers, fragile newborns, and infants” during and after a disaster, the White 
Ribbon Alliance created a guideline known as the Women and Infants Services 
Package (WISP) to present a framework for the minimum and initial actions 
needed by federal, state, and local governments, emergency planners and 
managers, nongovernmental organizations, private groups, and individuals.24 
One of the Alliance’s goals was to identify organizations at the 
national, state, and local level to utilize and implement the recommendations 
set forth in WISP.25 The WISP guidelines were intended to provide 
recommendations and to supplement existing emergency plans rather than to 
serve as a “parallel emergency system.”26 The recommendations included the 
preparation and storage of Family Readiness kits, emergency home birth kits, 
Sexual Assault Forensic Examiner kits, and Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
kits. The WISP guidelines also incorporated the March of Dimes’ “6 Key 
Elements For Every Disaster Plan” scheme, which designates special shelters 
for pregnant women & families with infants; encourages the accumulation of 
basic medical, health and hygiene supplies; and supports outreach efforts to 
the community through educational materials on emergency preparedness 
specifically related to maternal and child health issues.27 
 
B. The Flint Water Crisis 
 
Although Hurricane Katrina initiated policy reform on the management of 
maternal health issues, the emergency and disaster management framework was 
met with a new challenge in the face of the Flint Water Crisis. Flint demonstrates 
the ongoing concern for policies to adequately address the needs of vulnerable 
populations. The deficiencies in federal, state, and local government emergency 
plans to properly address the health needs of pregnant women and mothers after 
lead contamination from the city of Flint’s main water source has caused uproar 
in the Michigan community, the political sphere, and across the country. 
 
i. Comparing Hurricane Katrina and the Flint Water Crisis 
 
First, one of the main and obvious differences between Hurricane 
Katrina and the Flint Water Crisis is in the type of incident that occurred. 
																																								 																				
attention to the needs of pregnant women and newborns and making recommendations to 
remedy this). 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. at 26. 
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Hurricane Katrina was primarily a natural disaster that led to a public health 
emergency while the Flint Water Crisis may not strictly fall within the 
conventional definitions of a “natural” nor a “man-made” emergency or 
disaster. Second, Hurricane Katrina resulted in a Presidential emergency 
declaration, Presidential major disaster declaration, and an HHS Secretary 
public health emergency declaration.28 President Obama has declared the 
Flint Water Crisis an emergency, but not a disaster; HHS Secretary Burwell 
has not declared Flint a public health emergency.29 The major difference 
between a disaster declaration and an emergency declaration is the amount of 
federal assistance made available to states; a disaster declaration results in 
the availability of many more forms of financial assistance.30 
Despite these differences, Hurricane Katrina and the Flint Water Crisis 
trigger the same regulatory and legal framework under the Stafford Act. Both 
require state administered emergency and disaster plans to address the incident 
first and, if the state becomes overwhelmed, the governor can request federal 
assistance from the President. The two incidents are also exceptionally 
comparable in the effect they have had on the vulnerable population of pregnant 
women, mothers, and children. The Flint Water Crisis in Michigan presents a 
pivotal case study for the adequacy of current policies governing maternal health 
care in the emergency and disaster framework because lead contamination can 
have severe and fatal consequences for pregnant women and their children. 
 
ii. Reaching a Federal Emergency Declaration 
 
Under financial pressures, the city of Flint’s water source was switched 
from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department to the Flint River on April 25, 
2014.31 In August and September of 2014, Flint city officials issued “boil-water 
advisories” after bacteria was found in the tap water.32 However, the city 
continued to use the Flint River water source and Flint’s state-appointed 
																																								 																				
28 SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33096, HURRICANE KATRINA: THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESPONSE 5 (2005). 
29 Press Release No. HQ-16-004, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fed. Emergency Mgmt. 
Agency, President Obama Signs Emergency Declaration for Michigan (Jan. 16, 2016), 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2016/01/16/president-obama-signs-emergency-declarati 
on-michigan?utm_source=hp_promo&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=femagov_hp (last 
visited March 17, 2016). 
30 HUNTER, supra note 1, at 194. 
31 See STATE OF MICH., FLINT WATER TIMELINE: KEY DATES, http://www.michigan.gov/doc 
uments/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.pdf?20160119192241 (providing a 
timeline for the water crisis in Flint, Michigan). 
32 Jeremy C.F. Lin et al., Events That Led to Flint’s Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/21/us/flint-lead-water-timeline.html. 
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emergency manager, Jerry Ambrose, declined an offer to reconnect the city of 
Flint to Detroit’s water system without paying the $4 million connection fee.33  
In February 2015, Ms. LeeAnne Walters, a mother of four and Flint 
resident, notified the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of lead 
contamination found in the drinking water at her home34, Ms. Walters 
children suffered from rashes, hair loss, and stunted growth.35 In May 2015, 
“tests reveal[ed] high lead levels in two more homes in Flint.”36 In late May 
2015, emails between the EPA and Michigan State’s Department of 
Environmental Quality showed concern over the lead levels found at these 
two homes and Ms. Walters’ home.37 Several other tests’ results continued to 
show dangerous levels of lead in Flint’s water.38 
The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services confirmed the 
lead problem in October 2015 and urged city residents not to drink the Flint 
water.39 Two weeks after this announcement, the city of Flint was reconnected 
to the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department water source.40 On December 14, 
2015, the city of Flint declared a state of emergency.41 It was not until January 
2016 that Governor Rick Snyder requested FEMA’s assistance and the Michigan 
National Guard was mobilized to assist with water resources distribution.42 On 
January 14, 2016, Governor Snyder requested a Presidential declaration of major 
disaster and emergency to illicit federal assistance and financial aid.43 On 
January 16, 2016, President Obama declared a federal state of emergency but 
denied the request for a declaration of a major disaster.44 
 
iii. Maternal Health 
 
Even as funds finally make their way into Flint, the community has 
suffered the health effects of lead poisoning for over a year. Lead exposure is a 
major concern for pregnant women and nursing mothers who may suffer health 
																																								 																				
33 STATE OF MICH., supra note 31. 
34 Lin, supra note 32. 
35 Julia Lurie, Meet the Mom Who Helped Expose Flint's Toxic Water Nightmare, MOTHER 
JONES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/01/mother-exposed-flint-
lead-contamination-water-crisis. 
36 Lin, supra note 32. 
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effects including “[in]fertility, hypertension, and infant neurodevelopment.”45 
Lead poisoning causes damage to the brain and hinders neurological 
development in children and fetuses.46 Additionally, “because lead persists in 
bone for decades, as bone stores are mobilized to meet the increased calcium 
needs of pregnancy and lactation, women and their infants might be exposed to 
lead long after external sources have been removed.”47 
 
III. REDEFINING MATERNAL HEALTH CARE UNDER THE CURRENT 
DISASTER LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
Under the current disaster law framework, health issues faced by 
pregnant women in tragedies like Katrina and Flint are typically remedied 
through state and local government action followed by federal government 
participation when requested by the state’s governor.48 This coordination of 
immediate medical and health response during the course of emergencies and 
disasters, i.e. under the “health care classification,”49 focuses on individualized 
delivery of medical care and ensuring prompt access to and delivery of health 
care. Public health practice differs from health care in that the former “is aimed 
at decreasing the burden of illness and injury in populations, rather than 
individuals.”50 Although the health issues faced by pregnant women certainly 
affect women in an individualized manner due to their impact on a woman’s 
specific health care needs, maternal health care is also a public health issue 
because it affects the general public and community. Utilizing a “public health 
classification” would allow the federal government to render the care of pregnant 
women a federal priority and allow them to initiate response without waiting for 
a request from state governments. Resolving the gap in disaster preparedness and 
management for pregnant women is imperative because it simultaneously serves 
a benefit to society as a whole. When women’s health care needs are taken care 
of, they are able to contribute more meaningfully to society both socially and 
economically to empower themselves, their children, and their families. 
																																								 																				
45 Mary Jean Brown et al., Lead in Drinking Water and Human Blood Lead Levels in the 
United States, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP., Aug. 10, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6104.pdf. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See generally HUNTER, supra note 1. 
49 The “health care classification” is a term coined by the author of this Comment to describe 
federal emergency and disaster response to individualized health concerns under the Stafford 
Act. It is contrasted with the “public health classification” which operates under the Public 
Health Service Act (PHSA). 
50 SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31719, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PUBLIC 
HEALTH SYSTEM IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 5 (2005). 
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A. The “Health Care Classification” 
 
The United States disaster law framework is dispersed through a 
patchwork of statutes, federal government emergency plans and guidelines, 
and state and local laws. The framework implicates Congressional and 
Executive powers and the laws operate at the federal, state, and local 
government level. In particular, the federal government’s role in addressing 
health care issues is encompassed by the work of multiple federal agencies 
and the laws appear in many official documents.51  
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act of 1988 (Stafford Act) is the overarching federal statute, which provides 
for the mechanisms that allow the federal government to interact with states, 
local governments, and nongovernmental partners when dealing with 
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.52 Congress intended for the 
Stafford Act to fulfill a twofold goal: (i) to “provide an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and 
local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the 
suffering and damage which result from such disasters” and (ii) to 
encourage “development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and 
assistance plans.”53  
Under the Stafford Act framework, a state’s governor is responsible 
for the initial response to a disaster through execution of the state’s 
emergency plan.54 If the state’s resources are “overwhelmed” by the 
disaster, the governor must certify that the state’s capabilities have been 
reached and request that the President declare a major disaster or 
emergency.55 The Stafford Act authorizes the President to declare a major 
disaster or emergency when formally asked by the governor of an affected 
state.56 The President may also declare an emergency without the governor’s 
request if the emergency involves “federal primary responsibility.”57 A 
formal declaration allows the governor of a state to access both technical 
and logistical help from the federal government when state and local 
																																								 																				
51 See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH L. PROGRAM, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
SELECTED FEDERAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES PERTINENT TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
(2014), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/ph-emergencies.pdf. 
52 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. 100-107, 102 
Stat. 4689 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2012)). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b). 
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governments are overwhelmed by a disaster or emergency; it also triggers 
financial assistance from the federal government by allowing the state to 
unlock specialized pockets of funding available for emergency and disaster 
response.58  
While the Stafford Act does not have a specific provision dedicated 
to health concerns in times of disaster, there are many general references to 
medical and health matters throughout the statute. Generally, the statute’s 
main provisions are meant to allow the federal government to assist state 
and local governments “to alleviate the suffering and damage which result 
from such disasters.”59 Specifically, the Stafford Act authorizes the 
President to facilitate “professional counseling services, including financial 
assistance to state or local agencies or private mental health organizations 
to provide such services or training of disaster workers, to victims of major 
disasters in order to relieve mental health problems caused or aggravated by 
such major disaster or its aftermath.”60 The Stafford Act also authorizes the 
President to delegate responsibilities and the coordination of services 
(including medical and health response) to the appropriate government 
agencies.61 
The President is also authorized to direct a federal agency to utilize 
its authorities and resources to help and support state and local emergency 
efforts.62 Currently, the federal agency authorized to implement the Stafford 
Act and to coordinate all disaster relief administration to the states is the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).63 While FEMA was 
originally a fully independent federal agency, it lost its independent agency 
status when it became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
in 2002.64 This merger was meant to unify all emergency and disaster 
																																								 																				
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207; SELECTED FEDERAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES PERTINENT TO PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCIES, supra note 51, at 2. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (emphasis added). 
60 42 U.S.C. § 5183. 
61 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5196(b). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 5192. 
63 See 14 DEBORAH F. BUCKMAN, CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF ROBERT T. 
STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ACT (STAFFORD ACT), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 5121 ET SEQ., AMERICAN LAW REPORTS § 2 (2d ed. 2006). 
64 HUNTER, supra note 1, at 190 (explaining that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) 
updated the federal process for domestic incident management by creating DHS to unify 
national leadership in providing efficient and coordinated disaster and emergency 
preparedness and response; the merger of twenty-two individual agencies and organizations 
made DHS responsible for carrying out the functions of the transferred entities while acting 
as the central point of contact for all natural and man-made disasters and emergencies and 
also directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to be responsible for the nation’s 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities by way of the FEMA director). 
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management under the direction of one umbrella agency, DHS. However, 
FEMA remains the primary point of contact for states to trigger the disaster 
and emergency framework under the Stafford Act; state governors are 
required to make their request for Presidential declaration through the 
regional FEMA office, which makes a preliminary assessment of the 
damage.65 FEMA’s responsibilities also include supporting state and local 
efforts to “save lives” and “protect property and public health and safety.”66 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for 
coordinating the federal response in the public health and medical sectors in the 
aftermath of an emergency or disaster.67 This includes assessment of public 
health and medical needs, patient evacuation and care, public health and medical 
information gathering, and providing health and medical equipment and 
supplies.68 HHS has been authorized to “develop health and medical survival 
information programs and a nationwide program to train health and mental 
health professionals and paraprofessionals in special knowledge and skills that 
would be useful in national security emergencies.”69 HHS may request assistance 
from fourteen designated support agencies and the American Red Cross.70 
HHS carries out many of its federal public health emergency response 
tasks with the help of the CDC.71 The CDC administers cooperative agreement 
funds provided by Congress to states seeking to strengthen public health 
preparedness and response practices.72 The CDC also administers the Strategic 
National Stockpile program, which stockpiles and delivers large quantities of 
medicine and medical supplies to protect the American public in the event of 
an emergency or disaster.73 
As described, the Stafford Act framework charges FEMA, HHS, the 
CDC, and other federal agencies to work with states in coordinating the 
immediate medical and health response during the course of emergencies and 
disasters. It establishes the protocol for the federal government’s role and 
authority in responding to medical issues and ensuring delivery of health care 
in times of disaster. Maternal health issues in times of disaster fall squarely 
																																								 																				
65 Id. at 191-192. 
66 42 U.S.C. § 5192(b). 
67 See LISTER, RL33096, supra note 28, at 2. 
68 Id. at 3. 
69 Exec. Order No. 12,656, 3 C.F.R., 53 FR 47491, 47501 (Nov. 23, 1988), reprinted as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 5195 (2012). 
70 LISTER, RL33096, supra note 28, at 3. 
71 Id. at 6. 
72 See SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41646, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT: ISSUES IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 6-7 (2011). 
73 Id. at 17-18. 
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within this “health care classification” and the Stafford Act allows the federal 
government to focus on individualized delivery of care to pregnant women.  
 
B. The “Public Health Classification” 
 
i. Federalism Concerns 
 
Traditionally, states have held primary authority and responsibility to 
regulate behavior and address public health concerns through a state “police 
power” granted under the Tenth Amendment.74 State power and state 
government action to regulate public health are rooted in constitutional 
authority and are supported by public policy reasons. States are presumed to 
have greater familiarity with the needs of their jurisdiction and to be in a 
better position to address disparities in their own cities. 
Although the federal government does not hold constitutional authority 
to directly regulate or protect the public health, underlying policy concerns often 
invite federal government involvement through the means of other constitutional 
authorities or through legislative and administrative paths. The federal 
government often utilizes its spending power and Commerce Clause power in 
order to exert an influence on public health interests.75 For example, the federal 
government can condition a state’s receipt of federal funds on the state's 
compliance with certain federal public health policies.76 Congress can also rely 
on the Necessary and Proper Clause to spend money in aid of the general 
welfare.77 In addition, federal laws and regulations may pass muster with 
Congress if they are aimed at improving the overall health condition of the entire 
nation.78 Because of this vacillating tension between federal and state authorities, 
public health issues arguably straddle the regulatory and legal divide.  
The realm of emergency and disaster management law further 
complicates the divide because the onset of a disaster or emergency that 
overwhelms the state’s ability to handle the resulting public health issues can 
initiate the federal government’s right to involvement in state affairs. While the 
degree of federal involvement in an incident will depend on specific statutory 
																																								 																				
74 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
75 See generally James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 
12 J. L. & HEALTH 309, 333 (1998). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to Be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/24menu.html?_r=1 (arguing 
that Congress’ approval of a federal law requiring calorie labels firmly establishes the 
government’s role in improving the nation’s nutrition). 
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authority and issues of jurisdiction, there are additional outside factors and policy 
considerations to examine when determining how involved the federal 
government can be in a state’s incident management. These factors include state 
and local needs, requests made for external support, the economic ability of the 
affected area to recover from the incident, the type/location of the incident, and 
the severity and magnitude of the incident.79 Most notably, the need to protect 
the public health or welfare or the environment is a crucial factor to be 
considered in determining the level of federal involvement in emergency and 
disaster management. 
 
ii. Federal Authorities Pertaining Specifically to Public Health 
 
Legal authority for public health emergency and disaster 
management has been defined through statutes, federal guidance 
documents, and state and local laws.80 It involves many of the same federal 
agencies, such as HHS and the CDC, that are also tasked with addressing 
medical and health care needs in times of emergencies and disasters.81 The 
Public Health Service Act (PHSA) grants the Secretary of HHS authority 
to determine and declare that a public health emergency exists.82 After 
such determination is made, the Secretary is authorized “to ‘take such 
action as may be appropriate’ and to use funds from the Public Health 
Emergency Fund (when appropriated).”83 An HHS Secretary declaration 
allows the Secretary to utilize emergency powers to “provide states with 
resources and personnel to respond to the emergency and to waive or 
modify certain legal requirements.”84 
Most notably, in contrast to the Stafford Act framework, the Secretary 
of HHS may declare a public health emergency without a formal request from 
the state.85 Under Section 319 of the PHSA, “[t]here is no statutory or 
																																								 																				
79 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 6 (2004), http://fas. 
org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf. 
80 See generally SELECTED FEDERAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES PERTINENT TO PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES, supra note 51. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 3. 
83 Id. 
84 Public Health Service Act, Section 319 Fact Sheet, ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL 
HEALTH OFFICIALS 2 (2012), http://www.astho.org/uploadedFiles/Programs/Preparedness/ 
Public_Health_Emergency_Law/Emergency_Authority_and_Immunity_Toolkit/12-PH% 
20Srvc%20Act%20FS%20Final%203-12.pdf. 
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (stating that the Secretary of HHS may declare a public emergency 
after “consultation with such public health officials as may be necessary” without a formal 
state request). 
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regulatory requirement that a state submit a formal request to the secretary 
for the determination of a public health emergency.”86 States may work with 
the HHS regional office’s emergency coordinators to initiate a declaration by 
the Secretary of a public health emergency.87 “A state declaration of 
emergency does not affect the [S]ecretary's Section 319 authority to 
determine that a public health emergency exists. However, the fact that a state 
has declared an emergency or requested federal assistance in response to an 
emergency may be relevant to the secretary's consideration of whether a 
public health emergency exists.”88 
This is particularly significant for maternal health concerns because the 
Secretary can facilitate assistance to a state promptly by declaring a public 
health emergency with regards to the treatment of mothers and pregnant 
women faced with a natural or man-made emergency or disaster. While the 
Stafford Act requires state and local government to first expend their own 
resources and only request a formal declaration from the President when 
overwhelmed, the Secretary of HHS can intervene immediately to provide 
assistance to states to help pregnant women. As seen in Hurricane Katrina and 
Flint, earlier and immediate intervention by the federal government would have 
been especially valuable in saving the lives of women and children. 
 
IV. EXPANDING THE CURRENT DISASTER LAW FRAMEWORK  
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
 
In addition to redefining the maternal health scope to encourage the 
utilization of health care and public health declarations under both statutory 
frameworks, it is imperative that new legislation shape the way maternal 
health care issues are addressed in future disasters. 
 
A. Administrative and Legislative Reform Post-Katrina 
 
Hurricane Katrina resulted in a Presidential emergency declaration, a 
Presidential major disaster declaration, and two days later, an HHS Secretary 
public health emergency declaration.89 While health care and public health 
																																								 																				
86 Public Health Service Act, Section 319 Fact Sheet, supra note 84, at 2. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89See Mississippi Hurricane Katrina Major Disaster Declaration, DR-1604, FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 29, 2005), https://www.fema.gov/disaster/1604 
(detailing the declarations of the various bodies); Mississippi Hurricane Katrina Emergency 
Declaration, EM-3213, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 28, 2005), https:// 
www.fema.gov/disaster/3213 (same).  See also LISTER, RL33096, supra note 28, at 5. 
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problems often occur concurrently in an emergency or disaster, public health 
declarations are not utilized as often. The only prior incident where a federal 
public health emergency was declared before Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was 
the September 11th attack in 2001.90 However, because of the vast influx of 
health care and public health problems that arose post-Katrina, Hurricane 
Katrina served as a catalyst for administrative and legislative reform of the 
emergency and disaster law framework in the realm of health and public 
health policy. Katrina shed light on many of the shortcomings of the existing 
national response plan, leading to a restructuring of the old plan and 
implementation of new leadership roles into the disaster framework. 
Shortly after enactment of the HSA in 2002, President Bush issued 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 in order to “enhance the ability 
of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
comprehensive national incident management system.”91 As part of this 
initiative, Directive-5 required the DHS Secretary to create a unified national 
response plan.92 The National Response Plan was launched by DHS in 2004 
and was meant to align all federal coordination structures, capabilities, and 
resources into a unified management system.93 The National Response Plan 
faced its “first major test” in the coordination and implementation of a 
response to Hurricane Katrina.94 
Implementation of the National Response Plan during Hurricane 
Katrina resulted in a failure to coordinate the federal, state, and local response 
effectively.95 Since the National Response Plan was launched only eight 
months prior to Hurricane Katrina, it remained relatively new to many at the 
federal, state, and local level leading to a general lack of understanding 
regarding the “national” plan.96 The NRP provided a base plan meant to be 
supplemented through operational plans developed by federal departments 
and agencies; at the time Hurricane Katrina struck, these supportive 
operational plans did not yet exist or were in the process of being developed.97 
																																								 																				
90 LISTER, RL33096, supra note 28, at 5. 
91 Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 280 (Feb. 
28, 2003). See also KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33729, FEDERAL EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT POLICY CHANGES AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY 
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92 BEA, supra note 91, at 25. 
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 79. 
94 LISTER, RL33096, supra note 28. 
95 Chapter 5: Lessons Learned, in THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: 
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In addition, “[b]ecause the National Response Plan did not mandate a single 
federal point of contact for all assistance and required FEMA to merely 
coordinate assistance delivery, disaster victims confronted an enormously 
bureaucratic, inefficient, and frustrating process that failed to effectively 
meet their needs.”98 
Statutory and administrative changes were made as a result of the 
shortcomings revealed under the NRP. The National Response Framework 
(NRF) was established in 2008 to replace the NRP and serves as  
the “overarching interagency response coordination structure” for both Stafford 
Act and non-Stafford Act incidents.99 Congruently, the National Disaster 
Recovery Framework (NDRF), established in 2011, is a companion document 
to the NRF and serves as the overarching interagency coordination structure for 
emergency and disaster recovery.100 The NRF and NDRF  
sought to address some of the past shortcomings in health care and public health 
management in emergencies and disasters by implementing new structures. The 
NDRF introduced 6 new Recovery Support Functions including a “Health and 
Social Services Recovery Support Function.”101 In an attempt to promote overall 
health of individuals and communities, the Health and Social Services Recovery 
Support Function uses the term “health” to refer to and include “public health, 
behavioral health, and medical services” and seeks to establish an operational 
framework for how federal agencies can support local efforts more effectively.102 
The Health and Social Services Recovery Support Function specifically 
compensated for the NRP’s failure to mandate a single federal point of contact 
by establishing “a Federal focal point for coordinating Federal recovery efforts 
specifically for health and social services needs.”103 
In addition to the federal administrative changes attained, the debacle 
of Hurricane Katrina spearheaded statutory reform to the emergency and 
disaster law framework. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) “establishes new DHS leadership positions, 
brings additional functions into FEMA, [and] creates and reallocates 
functions to other components within DHS.”104 It also “enhances FEMA’s 
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99 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL DISASTER RECOVERY FRAMEWORK: 
STRENGTHENING DISASTER RECOVERY FOR THE NATION 6 (2011), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 
recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf. 
100 Id. at 3. 
101 Id. at 37, 52. 
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responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS.”105 The Post-Katrina Act also 
amends the Stafford Act to direct the appointment of a Disability Coordinator 
who is charged with “providing guidance and coordination on matters related 
to individuals with disabilities”106 in emergency preparedness and disaster 
relief. The Act’s establishment of a Disability Coordinator is notable because 
it creates a federal leadership position to specifically address the needs of a 
vulnerable population. 
 
B. The Need for Administrative and Legislative Reform Post-Flint 
 
Despite lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, current federal and 
state policies failed to adequately address maternal health care needs in the 
Flint Water Crisis. Because of the gross systemic failures of the Michigan 
emergency plans, federal legislation is needed to enforce a legally binding 
standard establishing minimum requirements for state and local governments 
to employ in the creation and maintenance of their emergency plans with 
regards to maternal health care. 
 
i. The (Lack of) Federal Response to Maternal Health Concerns 
 
While the EPA may have had notice of the lead contamination 
potential in the Flint water source since February 2015, they did not 
publically begin to acknowledge the problem until November 2015.107 The 
EPA encouraged all Flint residents “to either drink bottled water or to drink 
boiled water that has been already been filtered through an NSF-certified 
filter rated to remove lead.”108 It was not until February 2016 that they began 
warning of maternal health concerns and urging pregnant women to “[u]se 
only bottled water for water, food and formula given to babies under 1 year 
old, because [b]ottled water is the safest choice for pregnant or breastfeeding 
women and kids under 6 years of age.”109 
On February 26, 2015, almost a year before the Presidential 
emergency declaration was made, emails between the EPA and Department 
of Environmental Quality discussed high levels of lead found in the Flint 
River water source being distributed to the entire city of Flint.110 Despite this 
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106 6 U.S.C. § 321b(b)(1) (2012). 
107 See STATE OF MICH., supra note 31. 
108 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Statement On Flint Water Main Break, Boil 
Water Order (Feb. 12, 2016), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/5B62CBB90C 
7A891485257F570060BD43 (last visited June 12, 2016). 
109 Id. 
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revelation, the HHS Secretary did not declare a public health emergency under 
the PHSA. An HHS Secretary declaration could have allowed federal 
intervention at a much earlier stage and saved many pregnant women and 
children from detrimental lead exposure. The under-utilization of the HHS 
Secretary federal public health declarations power shows the failure of the 
existing legal framework to adequately address the health care and public health 
issues underlying maternal health concerns in an emergency. To this day, the 
HHS Secretary has not declared a federal health emergency, which could unlock 
supplementary sources of financial aid and assistance to the city of Flint.111 
 
ii. The State Response: Michigan’s Failures  
 
The severe delay of state and federal agencies to detect and respond to 
the lead contamination of the Flint water source led to longer exposure and an 
increased likelihood of pregnant women and children suffering from potential 
long-term harms and health consequences of lead contamination. The delay in 
state and local government response is equally alarming because a Presidential 
emergency declaration could have been requested and financial assistance 
initiated at a much earlier stage. Many of the state and local government actions 
taken even after the emergency declaration are failing to adequately address the 
specific health care needs of pregnant women. On March 3, 2016, HHS 
approved Governor Snyder’s request for a Medicaid demonstration waiver that 
would allow those impacted by the Flint Water Crisis to receive Medicaid 
regardless of income.112 The request, however, would only cover children under 
the age of 21 and pregnant women for the “duration of the pregnancy and during 
the two calendar months post-delivery.”113 According to the CDC, lead 
contamination can remain in the bones of pregnant women, lactating women, 
and their infants for decades after the external source of lead is removed .114 
Women suffering from this disaster should be under long-term care and medical 
assessment. While at first glance this policy appears to be taking maternal health 
issues into consideration, it is regrettably inadequate and uninformed. Further 
																																								 																				
111 See Public Health Emergency Declarations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/Lists/Public%20Health%20Emergency
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review of the state’s general emergency and preparedness plans reveals a severe 
lack of policies addressing maternal health care needs in the face of any 
emergency or disaster. 
The Michigan state emergency plans failed to adequately prepare its 
citizens to address the health care needs of pregnant women in preparation 
for, during, and in response to any and all emergencies and disasters. The 
State of Michigan failed to prepare its citizens and provided no mention of 
any preparation strategies in its Family Preparedness Guide distributed by the 
Michigan State Police, Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
Division.115 The Guide provides information on creating a general Emergency 
Supply Kit, an Automotive Supply Kit, and a Pet Emergency Kit for in-home 
use before, during, or immediately after a disaster.116 However, no mention is 
made of anything that resembles a lead-testing kit, Family Readiness kit, 
emergency home birth kit, Sexual Assault Forensic Examiner kit, or Sexual 
Assault Nurse Examiner kit as recommended by WISP.  
In addition, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services 
does not provide health care facilities with any emergency planning resources on 
the health issues affecting pregnant women in emergency or disaster.117 While 
there are some resources on working with older Americans and individuals with 
disabilities,118 there is a lack of guidance to specifically assist health care 
facilities with the specialized needs of pregnant women. The planning regulation 
makes an attempt at addressing the needs of some of their vulnerable 
communities–the elderly and disabled–to the complete detriment of women, 
who represent half of the population. 
Lastly, Michigan failed to enact sufficient policies to address the health 
care needs of women in its own state administered emergency plan. The 
Michigan Emergency Management Plan refers to pregnant and nursing women 
as part of a “Functional Needs Population”119 and acknowledges that they are 
part of an especially vulnerable population in times of emergency and disaster. 
																																								 																				
115 See EMERGENCY MGMT. & HOMELAND SEC. DIV., MICH. STATE POLICE, FAMILY 
PREPAREDNESS GUIDE, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/familypreparedness_color_ 
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management and mass shelter support plan). 
Vol. 1:1]                           Mothers in Crisis              143 	
	
Yet, this is the only mention of women’s specialized needs in the entire 377-
page state emergency plan. The Emergency Management Plan’s Evacuation 
and Mass Shelter Support Plan further elaborates on the “Functional Needs 
Population” and calls for assessment and reporting of the impact of disaster on 
these populations but again does not set forth any policies on how to address 
the needs of those in the functional needs population.120  
If the Flint Water Crisis had resulted in an evacuation of families from 
their homes as it did in the Picher, Oklahoma lead contamination121 or the Love 
Canal incident in Niagara Falls, New York,122 Michigan would have still been 
unprepared to manage the health care needs of pregnant women. The Michigan 
State Police Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division’s Local 
Evacuation And Mass Care Planning Handbook includes several worksheets for 
dealing with members of the “Functional Needs Population.”123 These 
worksheets are meant to promote preplanning for “Functional Needs Support 
Services” and include planning and operational considerations for individuals 
with diabetes, the elderly, individuals who are blind or deaf, wheelchair users, 
individuals suffering from epilepsy, individuals suffering from autism, and those 
with cultural and religious needs.124 Even though the Emergency Management 
Plan defines pregnant and nursing women as part of the “Functional Needs 
Population,” these women’s health care needs are not incorporated into the 
Handbook’s worksheets. Despite the seeming recognition of pregnant women’s 
health care needs as a state priority, the needs of pregnant and nursing women are 
not actually incorporated into the state’s emergency plan in a comprehensive, 






120 EMERGENCY MGMT. & HOMELAND SEC. DIV., MICH. STATE POLICE, MSP/EMHSD PUB. 
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123 See EMERGENCY MGMT. & HOMELAND SEC. DIV., MICH. STATE POLICE, MSP/EMHSD 
PUB. 113, LOCAL EVACUATION AND MASS CARE PLANNING HANDBOOK (2013), https:// 
www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/Local_Evacuation_and_Mass_Care_Planning_Handbo
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124 Id. at 230-237. 




As evidenced by the recent management of the Flint Water Crisis, 
current federal, state, and local policies remain incapable of addressing the 
needs of pregnant women in preparation for, during, and in response to 
emergencies and disasters. A combination of new administrative, statutory, 
and policy reform is needed to incorporate maternal health issues into the 
emergency and disaster law framework in a more meaningful, effective, and 
practical manner. First, addressing the needs of pregnant women can be 
accomplished by working within the current legal framework to redefine 
maternal health care as a public health priority and encourage more timely 
declarations under the PHSA. Second, the needs of pregnant women should 
be addressed by expanding the disaster law framework through legislation. 
The Flint Water Crisis, like Hurricane Katrina, should serve as a propeller for 
legal and policy reform. Policymakers should utilize the current social and 
political uproar to shed light on the shortcomings of maternal health care 
management in emergencies and disasters.  
Because maternal health care is a niche area that straddles both health 
care and public health matters, policies should encourage declarations under 
both the Stafford Act and the PHSA frameworks. It is imperative that the 
scope of maternal health issues in times of emergency and disaster be 
redefined and extended into the public health field. Allowing maternal health 
to float within and between both definitions allows greater federal 
involvement. The benefit to addressing maternal health issues under both the 
Stafford Act and PHSA frameworks is twofold. First, an issue that is viewed 
as affecting the population on a grander scale (rather than on an individual 
basis) heightens public awareness and therefore increases public involvement 
in preparedness efforts through a “whole of community”125 approach. Second, 
public health emergencies trigger federal statutes outside of the traditional 
Stafford Act framework. 
While individualized health care/medical complications and 
population-wide public health problems often occur concurrently in an 
emergency or disaster, there remains a consist underutilization of federal 
public health declarations independent of and in conjunction with emergency 
and major disaster Stafford Act declarations. The most recent public health 
emergency declaration to date was made as a consequence of Hurricane 
																																								 																				
125 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FDOC 
104-008-1, A WHOLE COMMUNITY APPROACH TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES, 
THEMES, AND PATHWAYS FOR ACTION (2011) https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 
20130726-1813-25045-0649/whole_community_dec2011__2_.pdf (providing information 
for community preparedness). 
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Sandy in 2012.126 As yet, HHS Secretary Burwell has not declared the Flint 
Water Crisis a public health emergency.127 This is perplexing since a public 
health emergency declaration by HHS could initiate disbursement of much-
needed federal funds and assistance from the federal government faster, 
earlier, and without the need for a state request. The PHSA clearly defines 
HHS’ authority to make their own determination that a public health 
emergency exists, to take such action as may be appropriate and to provide 
states with resources and personnel to respond to the emergency.128 Since 
legal authority for HHS to exercise its public health declaration powers is 
unambiguous, rules and regulations should encourage and set guidelines for 
HHS declarations as a matter of good public policy. In particular, guidelines 
should be adopted regarding HHS public health declarations in the event of 
specific health crises affecting vulnerable populations such as pregnant 
women, who often suffer the most at the hands of a drawn-out or prolonged 
request from the governor of a state for presidential declaration under the 
Stafford Act framework. 
In addition to redefining maternal health care within the legal 
structure, it is necessary to expand the current disaster law framework 
through new legislation. Hurricane Katrina certainly ignited concern about 
the failure of federal, state, and local emergency disaster plans to address the 
health care and public health needs of pregnant women. However, most of 
the responses came from federal agency and NGO guidelines. While these 
documents were meant to assist local and state governments in their 
emergency planning and response efforts, they are essentially rendered 
toothless because they are not legally binding requirements. 
Legislation is needed to enforce a legally binding standard 
establishing minimum requirements for state and local governments to 
employ in creation and maintenance of their emergency plans. While the 
emergency and disaster law framework relies on FEMA’s underlying concept 
of a “whole of community” approach that encourages community 
involvement in preparedness and response, state and local governments must 
be given the proper guidance to facilitate an emergency plan that addresses 
and involves the whole community. If the public health and medical needs of 
pregnant women are placed solely in the hands of individual state and local 
governments, standards of treatment, priority, and care will vary drastically. 
Establishing a federal model will improve maternal health care nationwide 
by setting a minimum precedent for standard of care which states must 
																																								 																				
126 Public Health Emergency Declarations, supra note 111. 
127 Id. 
128 See SELECTED FEDERAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES PERTINENT TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGEN-
CIES, supra note 51. 
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comply with and which they are free to exceed. The proposed legislation 
should also mirror the Post-Katrina Act in its creation and appointment of a 
Disability Coordinator by directing the creation of a federal leadership 
position to specifically address the needs of another vulnerable population: 
pregnant women. 
As the study of emergency and disaster law in the United States 
continues to develop and expand through its patchwork of federal, state, and 
local laws and policies, the framework must be inclusive of the needs of all 
individuals in the population. Maternal health care needs are a human issue 
and must be incorporated into disaster and emergency preparedness and 
response in meaningful ways. Only then can we begin to move closer to the 
actual realization of a “whole of community” approach to disaster and 
emergency management. 
 
